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Placing China, Japan, and Korea in Central Asia
Many studies have been published in recent years focusing on the 
foreign policy of various powers in Asia. These studies tend to focus 
primarily on the countries and areas in Asia that have historically 
received extensive attention, particularly China, Japan, and South 
Korea in East Asia. However, few studies go beyond traditionally cov-
ered areas to focus on parts of Asia that, while becoming central to 
various international engagements, remain overlooked. One such ex-
ample of an area not paid due attention in the literature on compara-
tive aspects of the foreign engagements of Japan, China, and Korea is 
what can be referred as the last “new frontier” in Asia—Central Asia 
(CA) (Dadabaev 2018b).
The post-Soviet CA region—consisting of the five stans of 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—
has remained marginal for Asian scholars for a number of reasons. 
First, this region has often been associated with the geopolitically 
determined larger Eurasian region consisting of Russia and other 
post-Soviet constituents. Thus, for many scholars in International 
Relations (IR), this region has been approached through the analysis 
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of Russian and post-Soviet policies, while the Asian angle of CA states’ 
interactions has been overshadowed and to some extent hijacked by 
Russia-related scholarship.¹ Second, those few studies that paid atten-
tion to the CA states’ interactions with Asian powerhouses, in com-
parative perspective, tended to focus on these states’ participation in 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or their foreign poli-
cies related to the recently announced Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).2 
Thus, once again, the framing of the CA region’s coverage within the 
Asian political space has been hijacked by the attention paid to China-
related initiatives, often with the rise of China and its global and 
regional economic influence as underpinning.³ Third, those studies 
that intended to cover CA states’ engagements with Asian countries 
frequently focused on individual case studies of CA-China, CA-Japan, 
or engagements between this region and South Korea.⁴ Very few 
studies, if any, have attempted to consider the mutual importance of 
CA states and powerful Asian countries in such interactions.⁵ In ad-
dition, differences and similarities in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean 
interactions have rarely been compared.⁶ However, any conclusions 
on the role and significance of the 
Asian vector in foreign policies for 
CA states are difficult to make with-
out an empirically grounded com-
parison of CA interactions with the 
most important and active states in 
this region: China, Japan, and South 
Korea. 
China, Japan, and South Korea 
have been actively involved in vari-
ous developments in CA since CA 
states’ independence from the Soviet 
Union in 1991. In 1996, China launched its confidence-building 
mechanism, which became the Shanghai Five (three CA states, 
Russia, and China) and later, in 2000, the SCO.⁷ These efforts re-
sulted in significant progress in confidence-building, the resolution 
of border-related issues between these states, and the construction 
of a mechanism for combating terrorism, extremism, and separatism 
in this region. Almost a decade later, China launched a new “Silk 
Road offensive” aimed at enhancing economic cooperation among 
China, Japan, and South 
Korea have been actively 
involved in various 
developments in CA since 
CA states’ independence from 
the Soviet Union in 1991
3Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Inroads into Central Asia
the countries of the ancient Silk Road, which was partly a response to 
the stalled SCO. This initiative also represented a Chinese response 
to alternative ideas for economic cooperation in Eurasia, namely, the 
Eurasian Economic Union.⁸ 
Japanese involvement in this region was also especially significant 
in supporting the early nationhood of CA states in the early 1990s. 
This support was framed within the Eurasian (Silk Road) Diplomacy 
championed by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in 1997.9 It was 
subsequently supported by prime ministers Keizo Obuchi, Yoshiro 
Mori, and Junichiro Koizumi. By the early 2000s, Japan became one 
of the largest, if not the largest, Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) providers to the CA coun-
tries. Such ODA support has been 
translated into a region-building 
initiative by Japan. In particular, 
the Japanese government initiated 
the establishment of a Central 
Asia plus Japan dialogue in 2004, 
which aimed not only to establish 
a communications channel be-
tween Japan and CA states but also, and importantly, to encourage 
discussions of various regional problems by regional states. In this 
sense, the Japanese initiative has been one of the most significant 
decolonizing initiatives (offering alternatives to Russian and possi-
bly Chinese funding and infrastructure, which were formerly routed 
through Russia) undertaken by non-regional powers in CA because 
it offered not only a forum for such discussions but also practical 
financial support from Japan toward projects on which more than 
two CA countries can reach a mutually acceptable agreement.¹⁰ To 
emphasize the importance of CA to Japan, then Japanese Prime 
Minister Koizumi visited Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 2006. A 
decade later, in October of 2015, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited 
all five CA republics, promoting new initiatives such as high-quality 
infrastructure¹¹ and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy to fur-
ther advance Japanese corporate interests internationally and in the 
CA region.¹² Japan has displayed significant commitment toward the 
region, demonstrated by the scale of its support toward CA states as 
indicated in Table 1.¹³ 
Japan became one of the largest, 
if not the largest, Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) 
providers to the CA countries
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Table 1. Japanese ODA Offered to the Countries of Central Asia 
on a Bilateral Basis by Country (USD million)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Uzbekistan 30.92 40.16 63.22 99.75 60.02 29.60
Kazakhstan 43.93 30.13 136.27 134.34 69.68 28.19
Kyrgyz Rep 23.15 8.12 31.23 26.69 20.95 17.22
Tajikistan 4.61 26.96 4.77 6.58 9.93 8.04
Turkmenistan 16.42 11.37 6.80 2.22 0.13 0.62
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Uzbekistan 70.29 64.53 41.92 34.08 31.26 26.25 56.49
Kazakhstan 55.39 56.63 63.38 30.56 19.79 30.89 36.99
Kyrgyz Rep 15.69 12.49 18.06 23.50 30.99 19.98 17.87
Tajikistan 9.43 8.06 26.24 43.42 35.59 32.98 26.66
Turkmenistan 0.38 0.57 1.15 1.55 1.27 0.53 0.56
Source: Compiled from the data made available by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan, Seifu Kaihatsu Enjyo (ODA) Kunibetsu de-tabuku 2014 (Chuou ajia/kokasasu 
chiiki), [Official Development Assistance by Country Data Book 2014 (Region of 
Central Asia and Caucasus)], Tokyo, Japan, accessed July 15, 2015, http://www.
mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000072593.pdf.
The South Korean presence in both CA and Uzbekistan, in par-
ticular, demonstrates some additional features in addition to those 
seen in the Chinese and the Japanese policies. Similar to Japan in the 
two cases described above, South Korea has demonstrated a desire for 
its own region-building scheme along the lines of Korea plus Central 
Asia, which to some extent was influenced by learning about the ex-
periences of the Central Asia plus Japan initiative. However, some 
features distinguish Korea from China and Japan. The first is the pres-
ence of the large Korean diaspora, whose influence on foreign policy 
has been overstated by previous studies merely because its majority 
can be referred to as Korean only to a relative degree. Many, if not all, 
of the Korean diaspora speak Russian as their primary language, while 
those who speak Korean had to learn it as a foreign language. Their 
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degree of association with the aims and goals of Korean foreign policy 
in CA is uncertain simply because Korean foreign policy in the region 
is very diverse and does not include the idea of uniting all those who 
are referred to as part of the Korean diaspora. To some extent, though, 
the presence of a Korean diaspora can also be related to increased 
people-to-people contacts and Korean visa policy, which is discussed 
in the second half of this paper. The second feature manifest in the 
Korean penetration of CA is the fact that Korean private/corporate 
interests are visibly more active and flexible when compared to public 
institutions and governmental agencies. By the time the Korean gov-
ernment properly framed its initiative, roughly 15 years after the col-
lapse of the USSR, South Korean Daewoo, Samsung, LG, Daewoo 
Unitel (a communications company), Kabool Textiles (a cotton 
processing and textile production company), and many other brands 
had thriving businesses in car manufacturing, textile processing, and 
electronics assembly, most notably in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. 
Thus, the successes of these enterprises have pulled the Korean gov-
ernment’s larger involvement into CA in a spillover effect. Essentially, 
the successes of individual Korean enterprises sent a message to the 
Korean government that CA, and Uzbekistan, in particular, is an area 
where Korean (public and corporate) interests have great potential. 
This process has led to the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership 
with Uzbekistan in 2006 as well as other agreements opening new 
frontiers, including extraction agreements with the Korea National 
Oil Corporation (KNOC) in 2006; Uzbekneftegaz’s granting to 
KNOC exclusive exploration rights to the Chust-Pap, Namangan-
Terachi, the Surgil gas fields in 2008; and purchases of uranium by 
the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) in 2008, to name 
a few. Navoi airport has become another infrastructure project, with 
the Hanjin Group establishing and developing a Navoi logistical hub 
with a certain degree of success.
Thus, by the time South Korea’s Silk Road diplomacy was an-
nounced in 2009, South Korea’s economic presence in CA, particu-
larly in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, was significant in terms of ODA 
assistance (drawn by corporate successes of the early 1990s and 2000s), 
direct investments, and human resource development. The Korea 
International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) has been allocating sig-
nificant funds for various human-resource development projects that 
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were considered not only to be contributing to Uzbekistan but also 
to be preparing human resources needed for the Korean presence in 
CA and for South Koreans domestically. President Lee Myung-bak 
again visited CA in 2011 and took part in the opening of several 
enterprises with South Korean capital. This visit was followed by the 
initiation of a South Korea plus Central Asia dialogue. In this sense, 
in contrast with China and Japan, Korean region-building did not 
start from political initiatives but instead grew out of economic and 
social engagement with the region. 
The third feature that distinguishes Korea’s engagement from that 
of China and Japan is the aspect of people-to-people communica-
tion. Here again, one can distinguish among these three cases. In the 
case of China, the access of the CA population to China is extremely 
limited, with visas very difficult to obtain, despite all the rhetoric 
of friendship between China and CA states. This limitation again 
shows that China is not interested in promoting people-to-people 
communications because it sees more threats than benefits from such 
contacts (namely, support for repressed ethnic Turkic groups such 
as Uighurs within China). Japan maintains a fair amount of people-
to-people contacts with many scholarships extended to CA students 
and, in recent years, has eased visa regimes to allow those satisfying 
certain criteria to visit Japan for social reasons. Uzbekistan, along 
with other CA republics, has abolished a visa requirement for short-
term visits for Japanese tourists. In addition, South Korea is perhaps 
the most advanced in these poli-
cies, as it not only issues visitation 
permits and visas for Uzbeks but 
also, importantly, attracts abundant 
human resources into the Korean 
labor market. In fact, Uzbeks (all 
those carrying Uzbek citizenship, 
including Uzbek citizenship holders 
of Korean descent) currently rank as the 5th largest group among 
foreigners residing in South Korea (at approx. 55,000 or 3% of all 
foreigners), following foreign residents from China (approx. 1 mil-
lion residents or 50%), Vietnam (approx. 150,000 or 7.3 percent), 
the United States (approx. 140,000 or 6.8 percent), and Thailand 
(approx. 100,000 or 5 percent).¹⁴ As this statistic shows, the level of 
Uzbeks currently rank as 
the 5th largest group among 
foreigners residing in 
South  Korea
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Uzbekistan’s connection with and penetration by South Korea is not 
limited to corporate contacts only but extends to social spheres to a 
degree that cannot be compared to China and Japan. 
As clearly outlined above, these East Asian countries have signifi-
cant influence in the CA region and are increasingly diversifying their 
areas of interest. China ranks the highest in trade with Uzbekistan, 
while Korea is among the top economic partners, as seen in Figure 1. 
Japan is one of the largest ODA providers to CA, and to Uzbekistan 
in particular. 
Figure 1. Uzbekistan’s Main Trading Partners and Trade Volumes, 
2017 (percent of total)
Source: Vneshne-torgovyi balans Uzbekistana sostavil 17.8 milliarda [External Trade 
Balance of Uzbekistan Reached USD 17.8 billion], Gazeta, August 14, 2018, ac-
cessed August 14, 2018, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2018/08/13/foreign-trade/. 
Despite the significant influence these states have, little if any lit-
erature focuses on the nuances of their influences and the features of 
their involvement rather than solely on the perceived rivalry among 
them. In addition, few details of their projects are provided, with 
no attempt to evaluate their performance in the CA region from a 
comparative perspective. 
To fill this gap, this study aims to shed light on the place and role of 
CA states and Asian powerhouses (such as China, Japan, and Korea) 
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in one another’s policies. To do so, this study analyzes the economic 
cooperation roadmaps agreed upon between governments of CA 
states and China, Japan, and South Korea in 2017. Because coverage 
of all CA states is logistically difficult within this study, Uzbekistan 
has been selected as the case for CA states, and the cooperation road-
maps between Uzbekistan and its East Asian counterparts are this 
paper’s main analytical focus. 
This paper raises the following research questions. What are the 
areas of interest for China, Japan, and Korea in their relations with 
CA states? What are the patterns of agenda-setting in establishing 
intergovernmental cooperation? What are the particular projects 
that these states initiate? What are the objectives of projects initiated 
within these areas of interest? How competitive or complementary 
are these projects of China, Japan, and Korea? 
Structurally, this study consists of five main sections. The first 
section details the reasons for choosing cooperation roadmaps in 
analyzing intergovernmental cooperation. This section also outlines 
the reasons for focusing on Uzbekistan among other CA states while 
indicating the significance of this analysis for understanding Chinese, 
Japanese, and Korean foreign policies. The second section then analyz-
es the patterns of agenda-setting, the actors in such processes, and the 
process of constructing cooperation roadmaps between China, Japan, 
and Korea and their CA counterparts, as exemplified by Uzbekistan. 
The third, fourth, and fifth sections then discuss country specifici-
ties of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean roadmaps with Uzbekistan and 
highlight their similarities and differences. The final section compares 
the similarities and differences among these states in their coopera-
tion schemes with CA states. 
Why Is It All About the Roadmaps?
The analysis of the economic cooperation roadmaps—sets of step-by-
step plans for cooperation—is chosen as this paper’s main method-
ological tool for two reasons. First, while discourses on the intentions 
of various powers in engaging CA states have been analyzed on mul-
tiple occasions, few studies, if any, consider the particular projects 
these states plan and analyze their reasoning and implementation. 
Second, while speeches and statements of presidents, foreign min-
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isters, and policy officials inform our understanding of the relations 
between CA and East Asian states, the roadmaps of cooperation 
demonstrate how these politically articulated intentions materialize 
in the practical realm. That is not to say that roadmaps are necessarily 
realizable plans. However, they are the most tangible plans that are 
closest to the practical outcomes of governments’ articulated inten-
tions and discourses. In this sense, this study attempts to understand 
the practical nuances of the engagement of China, Japan, and Korea 
in this region by analyzing plan outlines within roadmaps worked out 
by intergovernmental committees (IGC) of related states. 
In terms of country coverage, ideally outlines of roadmaps of all 
CA states in their relations with China, Japan, and Korea would 
be analyzed. However, this task is logistically difficult as analyzing 
all roadmaps would require a significantly larger study that would 
need not only to analyze the roadmaps between CA and East Asian 
countries but also to compare various roadmaps between CA states. 
Therefore, this paper focuses on the analysis of the Chinese, Japanese, 
and Korean cooperation roadmaps with Uzbekistan.
There are also multiple reasons for choosing Uzbekistan. First, 
Uzbekistan is the largest CA state in terms of population. Uzbekistan’s 
stability and development impact the sustainability of CA regional 
development. Second, Uzbekistan is one of the few CA states that 
attempt to build an equal balance in its relations with Russia, the 
EU, and Asian states, which it 
does by always emphasizing that 
China, Japan, and Korea are stra-
tegically important partners. In 
comparison to Uzbekistan, other 
CA states, such as Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, or Tajikistan, tend 
to be over-dependent on Russia 
(through membership in the 
Eurasian Economic Community and Eurasian Economic Union) or 
on China (through a huge share of debt). In contrast, Uzbekistan 
pursued a foreign policy aimed at limiting its dependence on interna-
tional actors by eschewing military alliances and balancing relations 
with larger powers. In this sense, Uzbekistan is uniquely positioned 
for analysis as the country that, while not necessarily favoring one of 
Uzbekistan always emphasizes 
that China, Japan, and Korea 
are strategically important 
partners
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these states as its most important economic partner, still attempts to 
define the importance of each of these states for its economy. Third, 
Uzbekistan is the state that is currently transitioning from the pre-
vious president Islam Karimov’s dictatorial type of government to 
openness, embracing foreign engagements with various countries in 
the post-Karimov era.¹⁵ Thus, the case of Uzbekistan demonstrates 
the challenges of CA states in their engagements with their more 
powerful Asian counterparts. In addition, an analysis of Uzbekistan’s 
post-Karimov era economic engagements with East Asian countries 
demonstrates the elements of continuity and change in its foreign 
policy, thereby offering insights into the country’s behavior for the 
foreseeable future. Finally, the choice of Uzbekistan is unique from 
the perspective of inquiry into the foreign policy of China, Japan, 
and Korea. None of these states enjoyed necessarily friendly relations 
with CA in general or with Uzbekistan in particular prior to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, because these states were constituents 
of the Soviet sphere. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, these 
countries have represented the new political and economic frontier 
where China, Japan, and Korea can construct their relations in the 
conditions of a changing international order and the changing nature 
of their international standings. All of these states launched their 
initiatives in Uzbekistan in 1991. Thus, their starting positions in 
these regions were somewhat similar. Having now grown into the 
second-largest world economy, China is adapting to the necessity of 
dealing with smaller neighbors such as Uzbekistan. Japan and Korea 
are also in the process of adapting their behavior to the conditions 
in which their economic power has faded compared to China while 
seeing the need to expand their outreach into the CA region in search 
for new opportunities. Japan is in search of a new place and role in 
this Japan-friendly region where there is an articulate expectation of 
a larger Japanese presence, as demonstrated by various polls. Korea 
has invested heavily through its corporate penetration in CA and 
thus is interested in expanding its economic presence. This is espe-
cially important for Korea’s presence in Uzbekistan, where it enjoys 
support from the government after the successful visit of the Uzbek 
president to South Korea in 2017. In addition, both countries are 
engaged in region-building efforts with the Central Asia plus Japan 
initiative and the Korea plus Central Asia forum. While these are not 
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counterpoised to the Chinese SCO and BRI schemes, they represent 
Japanese and Korean efforts to present an alternative “other” to CA 
states. In this sense, the analysis of roadmaps of cooperation provides 
insights into foreign policy behaviors and factors that are important 
both for efficient cooperation and for shedding light on the possible 
challenges in engagements with CA states, exemplified by the case of 
Uzbekistan with China, Japan, and Korea. 
The Economic Cooperation Roadmaps and the 
Agenda-Setting Structure
The role of intergovernmental cooperation in designing agreements is 
often demonstrated in bringing to conclusion contracts among state 
institutions, state agencies, and various corporations, many of which 
depend on governmental support. However, in negotiations between 
countries with limited market economies or excessive state presence 
in their economic activities, governments play significant functions 
that serve to guide state and non-state enterprises to motivate these 
actors in economic activities in order to move toward certain direc-
tions that the government prioritizes.¹⁶ 
In the case of post-Soviet CA states, exemplified by their engage-
ment with Uzbekistan, the government represents the developmen-
tal apparatus that frequently defines the areas of strategic importance 
and negotiates with foreign gov-
ernments in cooperating toward 
those goals. To some extent, such 
developmental functions, inclu-
sive of foreign policy, are also 
shared by the governments of 
China, Japan, and South Korea, 
making it easier for these coun-
tries to conduct their negotiations. 
In terms of the negotiation 
structure between China, Japan, South Korea, and Uzbekistan, they 
normally begin by establishing each state’s objectives and goals as 
defined in their domestic developmental goals and programs. Each 
of these is communicated at different levels, but most convention-
ally through the channels of the ministries of foreign affairs. Often, 
The government represents the 
developmental apparatus that 
frequently defines the areas of 
strategic importance
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such communications intensify when approximate dates for visits of 
heads of state, governments, or foreign ministers are decided. Once 
those domestic programs and goals are mutually articulated and duly 
recognized, the possible areas of cooperation are distilled from those 
programs. Most typically for the countries covered in this paper, the 
areas of trade, transportation infrastructure development, energy 
resource exploitation, innovation, and technologies and security are 
considered to be of primary importance. The degree of importance 
of each area fluctuates depending on the country. For instance, in 
cooperation with China, infrastructure development and security fea-
ture prominently, while in cooperation with Japan and South Korea 
human development, technological innovation, and modernization 
of infrastructure receive higher attention and importance. Once the 
areas of cooperation are defined, each government involved desig-
nates the main actor responsible for promoting cooperation within 
this area. In the case of Uzbekistan and some other post-Soviet states, 
the degree of centralization of governmental functions is very sig-
nificant and often results in a situation where a single ministry (for 
instance the ministry of economy) is the main actor in negotiating 
cooperation in several areas (such as infrastructure, transportation, or 
energy resources). In the cases of China, Japan, and South Korea, the 
situation drastically differs from one case to another. For instance, in 
the case of China the degree of centralization is somewhat close to 
CA states, so the same ministry is often responsible for promoting 
cooperation in the same area. In the cases of Japan and South Korea, 
the situation is very different, largely reflecting the degree of eco-
nomic liberalization and the central government’s decentralization, as 
described in the country-specific parts of this study. Once the main 
actors are defined by each government, these actors determine the 
most appropriate agencies and actors to assist them in promoting this 
area of cooperation. 
This process prepares the stage for proposals to be forwarded by all 
actors within the area of cooperation to be included in the proposal 
for action map. Normally, each side considers proposals for each area 
and then decides whether they want to forward these proposals to 
their counterparts. Initial discussions can be held through channels 
provided by ministries of foreign affairs and unofficially signaled 
to counterparts. In certain other cases, the actors of a potential 
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cooperation scheme visit the country or site of possible coopera-
tion to assess both the potential and the challenges for developing 
a successful cooperation scheme. This action is also often needed 
when certain public or private enterprises design their business plans, 
which requires a detailed assessment of local conditions, needed in-
vestments, and possible revenues to be generated from the project. 
Such potential plans are preliminarily signaled to the counterpart’s 
ministry of foreign affairs (MOFA), simplifying the process of fa-
cilitating the visits and gaining access to the data required for risk 
calculation. In this sense, the roles played by the governments in such 
cooperation schemes might not be necessarily to invest public funds 
into these projects but rather to provide a secure environment for 
private enterprises to enter the markets of countries they traditionally 
consider to be risk prone, such as Uzbekistan. Once the projects are 
offered as proposals, a meeting is held between the intergovernmental 
committee on cooperation and its subcommittees focusing on par-
ticular areas and consisting of representatives of both sides. 
When the interests of the different sides do not match, they move 
on to projects that are of greater mutual interest. In this sense, the 
establishment of the committee and the respective subcommittees 
creates a channel of communication and a sort of bargaining table 
that is open throughout the year on an ad hoc basis. This committee 
and its subcommittees are also a good way to signal certain policy 
and priority changes for each country. They help prevent miscom-
munications at the political level and provide coordination capacity 
for enterprise activity. 
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Figure 2. The Structure of the Initiation of Cooperation 
for Uzbekistan
While the Chinese government is well prepared and experienced 
in playing such leading and often developmental roles for its corpora-
tions and enterprises, the case of Japan demonstrates that the Japanese 
government is rather hesitant to play an active role in facilitating pri-
vate enterprise entry into the CA region, primarily because Japan has 
a completely liberalized and free market economy. In such a structure, 
Japan’s government (and the Japanese MOFA in particular) is rather 
hesitant to play a role in singling out a particular enterprise and 
promoting its interests, which might be interpreted as governmental 
interference into economic activity. Such a situation, however, does 
not necessarily represent a structural problem, and there continues to 
be an opportunity for the Japanese government to promote its private 
enterprises in the CA region without being accused of interference, as 
detailed in the section on the Japanese roadmaps below. 
The Korean case is somewhat different. Although in the Chinese 
and the Japanese cases the central government is frequently the 
engine for encouraging direct investments into CA economies, in 
the Korean case private enterprises are far more active in promoting 
cooperation, while the government plays reactive roles with respect 
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to such entrepreneurial activities. The Korean government does not 
play the pivotal role in initiating entrepreneurial activities, but it is 
often pulled into playing a more prominent role in the region where 
Korean enterprises have already built a significant economic pres-
ence. In addition, the spillover effect occurs to a certain degree in 
Korean involvement in this region when successful projects by certain 
enterprises encourage development of similar ones in other areas that 
are predominantly private interest driven. Such a spillover effect is 
not necessarily observed in the cases of Chinese and Japanese private 
participation.¹⁷ 
Once the proposals for each of the main actors responsible for 
cooperation in these areas are considered and analyzed, only those 
deemed to potentially produce tangible short-to-mid-term outcomes 
are included in the proposals for each area of cooperation. The pro-
posals are then grouped into framework agreements, contracts, and 
memorandums that constitute the backbone of intergovernmental 
cooperation roadmaps (see Figure 3). In this sense, the intergov-
ernmental cooperation roadmaps are sets of plans, agreements, and 
memorandums that document commonly shared norms, approaches, 
and objectives between Uzbekistan on the one hand and China, 
Japan, or Korea on the other.
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Figure 3. The Structure of Agreements
These economic cooperation roadmaps often reflect not only on the 
governments’ intentions and goals but also and importantly on the 
negotiating governments’ own developmental plans, programs, and 
goals. These then influence the negotiations by defining the objec-
tives of mutual cooperation as well as the place and role of these 
governments in each other’s development. In this sense, the state-
ments of presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers, and heads of 
individual agencies matter as articulations of intent. However, unless 
these are integrated into intergovernmental cooperation roadmaps 
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they do not carry much more than symbolic weight as far as policy 
is concerned. Thus, analysis of roadmaps is crucial and essential in 
understanding the practical aspects of announced cooperation goals. 
Country-Specific Agenda-Setting Patterns
The issue of agenda-setting and the manner in which the agenda is 
set are determinants of the negotiation outcomes between various 
counterparts. 
China, Japan, and Korea approach negotiations with CA states 
in seemingly similar ways, as exemplified by the case of Uzbekistan, 
demonstrated in Figure 4. In particular, the channeling role of the 
ministries of foreign affairs and governmental apparatuses is sig-
nificant for establishing cooperation between these states. However, 
the analysis of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean interactions with 
Uzbekistan demonstrate a significant degree of difference between 
the patterns of decision-making practiced by these three East Asian 
powerhouses with respect to their CA counterparts, as demonstrated 
by the case of Uzbekistan.
Figure 4. The Structure of and Roles Played by Various Actors
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That is not to say that all of these states adhere to a completely dif-
ferent pattern of negotiations from one another. Interestingly, some 
of these countries, such as China, have a strikingly similar structure 
in the way the government positions itself with respect to domestic 
and external actors in economic interactions, as outlined below. Such 
a pattern of behavior on the government’s part, which displays fea-
tures of the developmental (as opposed to the regulatory) function, 
unites perspectives of the Chinese and Uzbek governments, as both 
seem to share an appreciation of this kind of governmental leadership. 
In this sense, establishing communication channels among govern-
mental structures is detrimental to establishing effective inter-state 
economic ties.¹⁸ 
First, domestic signposting documents are similar and guide the 
agenda-setting on both the Chinese and the Uzbek sides. In the Uzbek 
case, this is the Development Strategy 2017–21, which has been 
analyzed elsewhere.¹⁹ This document’s significance is that it sets im-
portant goals and objectives for Uzbekistan’s economic development, 
which serve as critical signposts when approaching foreign counter-
parts. Unless these goals and objectives are met, Uzbekistan does not 
display a strong desire to enter into agreements. On the Chinese 
side, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Development 
and Reform Commission, and the Ministry of Commerce drafted 
an action plan in 2015 outlining policy coordination, connectivity, 
unimpeded trade, financial cooperation, and people-to-people bonds 
as the primary principles of Chinese engagement in other regions, 
including CA (Lain 2017). The same type of commitment has been 
displayed by the Uzbek governmental bureaucracy, which prepared 
its own roadmap emphasizing cooperation at the governmental level 
to facilitate trade.²⁰ 
Second, the similarities in patterns of governance between China 
and Uzbekistan can be cited as another factor significantly affecting 
cooperation’s success, which for the purposes of this paper, is defined 
as the number of agreements signed within the framework of the 
economic cooperation roadmaps. In particular, in the case of China 
and Uzbekistan governments not only advise and assist but essentially 
guide their corporations into certain sectors and fields of cooperation. 
In such a structure, the efficiency of negotiations is greater because 
they involve not only governmental agencies but, importantly, the 
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very actors in such cooperation. In countries with a completely liberal 
economy, like Japan or Korea, governments are limited in their ability 
to guide private corporations into particular fields or to select certain 
enterprises as primary actors of cooperation simply because govern-
ments in such liberal economies are considered to play only regulatory 
functions without any interference into economic activities. In this 
sense, the Chinese government displays a greater degree of flexibility 
and efficiency in attracting its enterprises to do business in CA, while 
for the Japanese and Korean enterprises it is a matter of taking risks 
and preparing local conditions for their entry into those markets.²¹ 
Figure 5. The Actors in and Patterns of Negotiations between 
China and Uzbekistan
As outlined in Figure 5, negotiations are led by the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Agency for 
Foreign Investments on the Uzbek side while the Cabinet of Ministers 
plays a coordinating function. In approaching Chinese counterparts, 
these actors follow the guidelines of the development strategy, seek-
ing the best-fit partners from among potential Chinese actors to 
fulfill these tasks. The proposals are presented to the Uzbek-Chinese 
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Intergovernmental Committee for Cooperation, co-headed by 
the Uzbek deputy prime minister and the secretary of the Chinese 
Communist Party’s Political-Judicial Committee (Uzbek-Chinese 
Intergovernmental Committee for Cooperation 2011).²² 
The intergovernmental committee’s work is divided among several 
subcommittees, such as those on trade and economic relations (co-
ordinated by the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce), cooperation in energy (coordinated by 
the Uzbek Ministry of the Economy and the PRC National Energy 
Administration), transportation (coordinated by the Uzbek Ministry 
of Foreign Trade and the PRC Ministry of Transport), technical and 
scientific cooperation (coordinated by the Uzbek Committee on 
Coordination of Science and Technology and the PRC Ministry of 
Science and Technology), cultural and humanitarian cooperation 
(coordinated by the Uzbek Ministry of Culture and the PRC Ministry 
of Culture), and cooperation in security-related issues (coordinated 
by the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the PRC Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs).²³ 
These committees meet at least once a year, with the issues to be 
discussed communicated through the channels of the coordinating 
institutions well ahead of the meetings. If the needs of Uzbekistan 
can be met by a Chinese enterprise, the Chinese coordinating agency 
frequently serves as the communication line to establish the contacts 
and invite the potential investors from China to discuss the project. 
Additionally, to facilitate connections between businesses, several 
ministries (for instance, the Uzbek Foreign Trade Ministry and the 
PRC Ministry of Commerce) have signed memoranda to organize 
producer exhibitions, which have eventually resulted in the visit of 
small- and medium-sized enterprise representatives from Tianjin to 
the Jizzakh and Sirdarya free economic areas and the decision to al-
locate certain areas in Jizzakh exclusively for entrepreneurs from that 
region of China.²⁴
However, this coordination capacity is only made possible through 
a certain degree of structural similarity in the relations between the 
governments and businesses, because these governments still play a 
much greater role than they would in countries with Western lib-
eral market economies. In addition, once an agreement is reached, 
the government of Uzbekistan still exercises significant control over 
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the economic activities of the enterprises, which is problematic for 
companies from other countries but acceptable to Chinese corpora-
tions due to the similarity of governmental controls in China. On the 
Uzbek side, a separate committee is created to ensure the agreements 
created for each partner country are implemented. For instance, aside 
from China, the latest development in this regard was the creation 
by Uzbekistan of a national committee to ensure the implementa-
tion of agreements with the United States.²⁵ The committee’s work 
is stipulated by roadmaps for cooperation with each country, and 
committee heads present reports on progress and the relevant direc-
tions of the roadmaps to the president between the 5th and the 10th 
of each month.
As a result of this work, the focus of the May 2017 visit of President 
Shavkat Mirziyoyev to China was obviously on the promotion of eco-
nomic ties between the two countries based on the “Shanghai spirit” 
bargaining strategy.²⁶ Even before this visit, Uzbekistan and China 
enjoyed a fair level of economic cooperation, as seen in the list of in-
vestment projects underway prior to 2017 announced by the Uzbek 
Ministry of the Economy.²⁷ The visit marked the signing of one of 
the most ambitious packages of agreements, including 11 intergov-
ernmental agreements, one intermunicipal agreement, and a package 
of economic contracts worth USD 22.8 billion.²⁸ It remains to be 
seen how many of these projects will reach their declared outcomes, 
and there is no comparable data to indicate the general ratio of imple-
mentation of these projects. However, as has been indicated to the 
author by the Uzbek government official anonymously interviewed 
in 2017, the fact of inclusion into the roadmap puts considerable 
pressure on government officials to do their utmost to ensure their 
implementation. Institutionally, the degree of implementation of 
these projects is checked at the governmental meetings held monthly, 
which when deemed necessary make needed corrections to ensure 
implementation of these plans. 
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Figure 6. Constituent Elements of the China-Uzbek Roadmap
Source: “Uzbekistan i Kitai Podpisali Ryad dokumentov” [Uzbekistan 
and China Signed a Range of Documents], Review.uz, May 13, 2017, ac-
cessed September 23, 2017, http://www.review.uz/novosti-main/
item/11214-uzbekistan-i-kitaj-podpisali-ryad-dokumentov-spisok.
As described in the sections below, the most significant areas in 
which Chinese roadmaps envision cooperation are manufacturing, 
resource-related investments, and infrastructure development.
In contrast to the Chinese agenda-setting pattern, Japan’s ap-
proach represents a significantly different government-business rela-
tionship. While the Chinese-Uzbek interstate committee is primarily 
composed of government members, government-affiliated agencies, 
and state-run corporations as well as financial institutions, the Japan-
Uzbek interstate cooperation committee primarily aims to unite the 
prospective market actors. Thus, it positions itself as an institution 
representing the interests of a wider spectrum of actors, going beyond 
governmental institutions. The main idea of governmental partici-
pation in these negotiations is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and other related ministries merely play the role of facilitators of the 
dialogue between the private economic entities and humanitarian 
organizations. Such a prominent role of the governments sometimes 
leads to the abuses of authority on the part of both the host and the 
investors, such as the situation when some companies (in particular 
Nihon Koutsu Gijyutsu [Japan Transportation Consultants]²⁹ were 
caught paying bribes to Uzbek (and to Vietnamese and other states`) 
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officials in the process of ODA implementation, leading governments 
to place safeguards against such situations.³⁰ 
Although the Japanese government plays an important role in ar-
ranging a proper platform for dialogue, neither the Japanese foreign 
ministry nor any other state body aims to adopt a developmental role 
(persuading the Japanese participants, assisting in selecting the com-
panies, taking part in negotiating better treatment, etc.) or to lead 
the process. In addition, the Japanese government does not adopt the 
responsibility of defining the areas of the most pressing concern for 
its businesses but instead allows corporate interests to lead the discus-
sion. In such a situation, and in Uzbekistan in particular, govern-
mental desire alone does not represent sufficient support for certain 
corporate interests to get involved in CA. 
As if to reflect on this difference with China, the Interstate 
Committee on Economic Cooperation between Japan and Uzbekistan 
is composed not of public officials but largely of representatives 
from the commercial sector. These include representatives of vari-
ous corporations on the Japanese side, with the Japan Association for 
Trade with Russia & NIS (ROTOBO) playing the role of coordi-
nator for these activities. This representation also demonstrates the 
structural mismatch between Japanese and Uzbek expectations. On 
the Japanese side, an expectation exists that the corporate commu-
nity will express a desire to enter the Uzbek market once it gains 
confidence through information-sharing meetings and an increase in 
personal contacts. Therefore, the main actor in such interactions is 
the corporate community. On the Uzbek side, however, an expecta-
tion exists that the Japanese government needs to play a more active 
part not only in setting the stage for information exchange but more 
importantly in encouraging particular Japanese corporations to enter 
the Uzbek market. Such an expectation is well understood among 
Japanese policymakers. However, given the limitations of free eco-
nomic enterprises, the Japanese government limits its role only to 
information gathering and providing basic support to its corpora-
tions. Although the Japanese government’s position fits well with the 
principles of a liberal economic system, such a “birdwatching” stance 
does not seem to bring any tangible outcomes, since the other East 
Asian governments of China and Korea do not hesitate to openly pro-
mote the interests of particular corporations. The coordination role 
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of ROTOBO has also been criticized both by Uzbekistan and by its 
Kazakh counterparts on several occasions. The reason for such criti-
cism emanates from the fact that CA governments are represented at 
such meetings by representatives of ministries and state agencies that 
are in the position to make policy and practical decisions. At the 
same time, ROTOBO is an organization that is neither in a posi-
tion to propose a particular policy change nor able to implement any 
policy decisions. It is not a part of the executive body, and most of its 
views and perceptions are of a consultative nature, which has little or 
no relevance to the policy field. In addition, the Interstate Economic 
Committee is mismatched: on the Japanese side, it is jointly led by 
the representative of a Japanese corporation while on the Uzbek side 
it is supervised by the prime minister or the deputy prime minister.
Figure 7. Japan-Uzbek Economic Cooperation 
Committee Composition
Although the logic of this structure is that the committee becomes 
a meeting place between Japanese businesses and Uzbek bureaucracy, 
in practice, these meetings do not result in expected outcomes because 
these actors operate with different objectives. While the Uzbek bureau-
cracy operates on behalf of the government, the Japanese side aims at 
25Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Inroads into Central Asia
airing corporate voices, which are not connected to policy. In many 
cases, these committees turn into forum-type meetings that articulate 
many desirable objectives but produce very few tangible outcomes. 
As is often the case, entrepreneurs frequently express desires to enter 
certain markets and areas, including in Uzbekistan, but unless the con-
ditions are prepared in terms of the legal and financial infrastructure, 
the Japanese corporate community displays a significant degree of hesi-
tance in entering such markets, despite strong governmental support in 
facilitating such entry. This is perhaps the greatest difference in Japanese 
and Chinese corporate behaviors because Chinese corporations seek 
to compensate for the absence of legal and financial infrastructures 
through agreements between the governments that provide additional 
guarantees to the corporations entering Uzbekistan. 
With regard to Japanese and Korean corporate behavior, certain 
similarities exist between the two. However, Korean entrepreneurs 
seek to utilize the opportunities received in the negotiations during 
governments’ official visits, and if those agreements do not materi-
alize well many Korean companies immediately withdraw without 
hesitation. Therefore, the Chinese approach represents “high risk 
compensated by governmental guarantees,” while Korean corporate 
behavior can be summarized as “high risk, high return versus low 
return, fast retreat” and the Japanese behavior is closer to the model 
of “no risk, low/no return.” 
The composition of these countries’ interstate economic coop-
eration committees with Uzbekistan significantly influences the 
outcomes of deliberations. In line with the above explanations, in-
tergovernmental economic cooperation plans between China and 
Uzbekistan are heavily dominated by the projects implemented by 
private enterprises in the fields that remain of high interest to both 
the Chinese and Uzbek governments. Therefore, one can observe the 
invisible hand of both governments in guiding their enterprises into 
the fields they consider important for state development. In the case 
of the Japan-Uzbek commission, one can observe the dominance of 
intergovernmental agreements and commitments, mainly because 
the Japanese enterprises have not yet expressed an overwhelming 
commitment to involvement in projects in Uzbekistan. Thus, the 
majority of roadmaps consist of framework agreements between the 
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two governments and mutual understanding memorandums and 
agreements regarding Official Development Assistance projects. 
In the Korean case, as explained above, the agenda for cooperation 
is defined by only a few documents, such as the Strategic Partnership 
Agreement between Uzbekistan and Korea (2018–20) and the Uzbek 
Development Strategy (2017–21).
Figure 8. Korea-Uzbek Interstate Economic Cooperation 
Committee Composition
Few areas aside from active Korean entrepreneurial activities are 
the focus of cooperation between the two countries. One is the road-
map for assisting Uzbekistan to join the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), with Korea’s invaluable assistance in setting up electronic 
trade and e-governance platforms in Uzbekistan as well as areas of 
human resource development. Cooperation in these areas was so 
successful that a number of Korean nationals were appointed to the 
Uzbek Cabinet of Ministers at the rank of deputy minister to su-
pervise and implement reforms in these areas. This is a significant 
development for the CA region because few cases exist in which re-
gional countries, and especially Uzbekistan, open their governmental 
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structures to recruit foreign nationals for ministerial positions. Korea 
in this sense is considered somewhat of a “safe bet” because it pos-
sesses the required expertise yet displays understanding toward au-
thoritarian governance, as Korea itself has experienced the transition 
from a dictatorship to a democracy.
Figure 9. Korea-Uzbek Roadmap Agreements and Composition 
(USD billion)
Note: The figures are for a total of 67 documents.
The areas covered in the agreements that became the roadmap of 
economic cooperation are dispersed across very wide areas of cover-
age. Each area outlined in Figure 10 is composed of a number of 
agreements, each of which aims at smaller objectives and is often 
implemented by a different actor. Therefore, the roadmap of coopera-
tion with Korea in its essence is more dense and complicated when 
compared with the Japanese roadmap. It might not be as significant 
in terms of the overall amount covered by its projects when compared 
to the one with China, but in terms of project diversity and actor 
multiplicity, it supersedes the latter.
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Figure 10. The Areas and Projects of Cooperation Included in the 
Korea-Uzbek Roadmap of Cooperation
China’s Inroads into the Infrastructure, Resource, 
and Manufacturing Sectors
Two main areas are covered in the China-Uzbek economic cooperation 
roadmaps. These are infrastructure and resources, and manufactur-
ing/export-oriented industries. The largest economic infrastructure-
related agreements concluded between China and Uzbekistan as a 
part of the economic cooperation roadmap are those focusing on the 
joint production of synthetic fuel, investment in Uzbekistan’s oil in-
dustry, prospective new projects, cooperation in the construction of 
energy generation plants, railroad infrastructure development, and 
Tashkent to Osh (Kyrgyzstan) road construction. 
29Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Inroads into Central Asia
Figure 11. China-Uzbek Roadmap-Related Project Areas (USD 
billion)
In terms of establishing manufacturing lines in Uzbekistan, agree-
ments were reached on establishing production facilities for cement, 
textiles, electric appliances, metals, and glass.
Figure 12. China-Uzbek Roadmap-Related Production Facilities 
(USD million)
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One of the most significant infrastructure agreements, signed 
in May 2017, was between Uzbekistan and the PRC on facilitating 
smooth international road transportation between the two countries, 
which involves the simplification of procedures and the creation of an 
environment to increase the transportation of goods using land roads. 
This agreement followed all the internal procedures in Uzbekistan 
and has been confirmed by decree of the president (“Decree of the 
President of Uzbekistan” 2017).³¹ 
The project, which aims to connect China with Uzbekistan 
through the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic, has also been addressed 
in relevant signed agreements. It would connect the Uzbek city of 
Andijan and the Chinese city of Kashgar, via Osh and Irkeshtam in 
Kyrgyzstan, by both rail and motor road. This is the shortest route, 
and both countries are interested in its construction. ³² While China 
has for years been interested in a number of transport corridors to 
European markets through CA’s transport networks, these particu-
lar rail and motor roads are of particular interest and importance to 
Uzbekistan. They would allow Uzbekistan to shorten the distance to 
transport its goods into China by avoiding Kazakh railroads, which 
take longer and cost more. The new rail and motor roads would allow 
Uzbekistan to ship its goods directly, using the shortest route to 
China through Kyrgyzstan. 
In 2012, Kyrgyzstan drafted its own railroad project. It would cover 
more areas of Kyrgyzstan and be 380 km longer than the current rail 
system. For Kyrgyzstan, it would be a chance to develop its own railroad 
system and connect remote areas that the rail system currently bypasses. 
However, for both Uzbekistan and China this project would entail a 
longer transportation time for their cargo and much higher costs for 
the project in general. The plans suggested by Kyrgyzstan appear to be 
difficult for China and Uzbekistan to accept.³³ 
Both Chinese and Uzbek officials realize that a certain degree of 
caution is required with respect to Chinese infrastructure projects, so 
they need public engagement and awareness. To facilitate public ac-
ceptance of this project, the Chinese and Uzbek governments agreed 
to organize an auto rally along the route of the future railroad, which 
serves several important goals. First, it aims to promote to the public 
the transportation infrastructure development projects between 
Chinese and Central Asian counterparts. Second, it is a practical test 
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of the preparedness of areas where railroad construction is planned 
to determine any issues in the terrain and detail the infrastructure-
related facilities that must be constructed in this area. In addition 
to the railroad, the Chinese Railway Tunnel Group, which built the 
19-kilometer Kamchik Tunnel in Uzbekistan, has committed to the 
construction of a vehicle motorway under the tunnel, naming the 
project Kamchik 2 (“China to Help Build” 2017).³⁴ 
Uzbekistan’s exports of mineral and natural resources to China 
constitute a considerable share of the trade between the countries. 
According to other agreements concluded in May 2017 during 
Mirziyoyev’s visit to China, contracts were signed for natural gas 
(6 billion m3), uranium, textiles, leather, and agricultural products 
to be exported to China by the end of 2017. Plans have also been 
articulated for exports of natural gas to reach USD 2.4 billion for the 
years 2018 to 2020 (“Uzbekistan planiruet k 2021” 2017).³⁵
 
Figure 13. China-Uzbek Roadmap-Related Plans for Resource 
Exports (USD million)
Discussions were also held regarding new pipelines that would con-
nect natural gas endowed Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan 
to Chinese consumers to ensure a stable supply. However, no con-
struction plans or financial commitments have yet been achieved due 
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to uncertainties regarding the economic sustainability of the pipe-
lines’ operations.
Chinese companies, such as Shengli Oil and Freet Petroleum, rep-
resent strategic partners for the government and related corporations 
in the provision of pipes and other extraction equipment. According 
to sources aware of the negotiations between the government and 
Chinese corporations, at least three contracts for the supply of such 
equipment were signed during Mirziyoyev’s visit to Beijing in 2017.
China National Petroleum Corporation secured a co-financing 
contract from the Bank of China for a project for drilling at the gas 
condensate field in Bukhara, Uzbekistan, by establishing JV New Silk 
Road Oil and Gas, which was set up by Uzbekneftegaz and China 
National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Corporation (a 
subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation) (“Uzbekistan-
China JV” 2017).³⁶ According to the license granted to the joint ven-
ture, it plans to develop the existing wells and drill another 16, with 
annual production to reach 1 billion m3 of natural gas and 6,500 
tons of condensate (ibid.).³⁷ 
In terms of the generation of new industries, Uzbekistan concluded 
an agreement between Uzbekneftegaz and the Chinese Development 
Bank (worth USD 3.7 billion, of which USD 1.2 billion is to be 
financed by China) to finance the establishment of a plant to produce 
synthetic fuel at Uzbekistan’s largest gas refinery complex, Shurtan.³⁸ 
The plant would process 3.6 billion m3 of natural gas into 743,000 
tons of synthetic fuel; 311,000 tons of aviation fuel; 431,000 tons of 
naphtha fuel; and 20,900 tons of liquefied gas (“Uzbekistan i Kitai 
podpisali” 2017).³⁹ Technological support for the plant is to be pro-
vided by South Korea’s Hyundai Engineering and Construction under 
a license provided by South African Sasol. The technology for turning 
natural gas into liquefied gas would come from Dutch Haldor Topsoe.
A USD 3 billion agreement between the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce and Uzbekgidro stipulates the modernization of ap-
proximately 300 water pump stations to improve the efficiency of 
Uzbekistan’s hydroelectricity sector.⁴⁰ Uzbekistan developed and 
approved the strategy for hydro energy development in November 
2015 and aims to invest USD 889.4 million in the sector between 
2016 and 2020. The modernization of 15 hydroelectric stations is 
planned, to allow the generation of 5.25 billion kilowatts of energy. 
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This governmental program was essential in defining this area as a 
high priority in relations with China.
Modernization of energy generation in Uzbekistan has also been 
prioritized in negotiations. In particular, the China Railway Tunnel 
Group and the China Coal Technology and Engineering Group began 
modernizing a plant to extract 900,000 tons of coal per year, with the 
investment of USD 94.5 million (“Startovala modernizatsiya predpri-
yatiya” 2017).⁴¹ Nontraditional sustainable sources such as biomass 
generation have also been the subject of agreements. Uzbekneftegaz, 
AKB Agrobank, and China’s Poly International Holdings signed a 
memorandum of cooperation to set up the production of a modern 
biogas plants worth USD 10 million and to assist in the modern-
ization of eight domestic enterprises, including the Plant Oil and 
Gas and Chemical Engineering, JSC, in line with the governmental 
Program of Measures to Increase Biogas Plants in Uzbekistan for 
2017–19 (Tashkent Times 2017).⁴² Last but not least, solid waste 
processing infrastructure is being constructed to improve livelihoods 
and facilitate better waste utilization in both old and newly con-
structed quarters in Uzbekistan (Beston Machinery Company).⁴³
The second area targeted by the China-Uzbek economic coopera-
tion roadmaps is the area of manu-
facturing and export-oriented in-
dustry development. As described 
above, the new administration in 
Uzbekistan has defined certain 
areas in which China’s economic 
presence and technology are de-
sirable and advantageous. In line 
with the goals of the development 
strategy, the first such area is the 
establishment of small- and me-
dium-sized manufacturing plants 
to not only supplement imported 
products but also, importantly, 
produce goods that can compete in Central Asian markets.
In particular, Uzbekistan intends to establish long-term coopera-
tion with the Chinese Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation 
(CASIC) for the supply of scanning equipment for border control 
Uzbekistan intends to establish 
long-term coopera tion  
with the Chinese Aerospace 
Science and Industry 
Corporation (CASIC) for the 
supply of scanning equipment
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services, customs, airports, and rail infrastructure, the introduction 
of urban security systems (“smart city”), the protection of large facili-
ties and the border, the development and introduction of an indus-
trial Internet, joint production of a wide range of pharmaceuticals in 
Uzbekistan, and CASIC’s participation in the development of infra-
structure for the Central Military Clinical Hospital of the Ministry 
of Defense. This latter project includes creating a turnkey multidisci-
plinary medical and diagnostic building and equipping it with modern 
medical equipment, as well as producing oil and gas equipment.⁴⁴ 
To respond to the increasing demand for construction materials, 
the Uzbek government intends to facilitate the development of a 
cement plant (with Zhejiang Shangfeng Building Materials, at a cost 
of USD 203.9 million) (“New Cement Plant” 2017)⁴⁵ and glass pro-
duction (with MingYuan Silu, at a cost of USD 110 million) (“Glass 
Production Plant” 2017).⁴⁶ Another joint venture has been estab-
lished in the city of Gulistan, focusing on the production of elevators. 
In the Soviet era, Uzbekistan relied heavily on elevators produced in 
other republics, namely, Azerbaijan and Russia. With the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the replacement of installed elevators required 
importing them in great numbers. To fill this gap and respond to the 
increasing need for elevators in the booming construction business in 
Uzbekistan, the government sought China’s assistance in facilitating 
the production of elevators in Uzbekistan. As a result, a joint venture 
for the production of elevators (Modern Lift Systems) has been es-
tablished in the Syrdarya Region of Uzbekistan, funded by Chinese 
investors and using Chinese technology. It produces 300 elevators 
per year, plus 200 escalators and travelators (moving walkways). 
Although the joint venture produces elevators for internal consump-
tion, approximately 30 percent of its products are exported to other 
regional states (“Proizvodtsvo liftov zapuscheno” 2017).⁴⁷ 
In terms of memoranda and protocols, some of these have already 
materialized in production facilities, such as the one for the produc-
tion of soft and hard toys in Tashkent, based on the Soviet-era toy 
factory Tashkentigrushka (“O merakh po organizatsii” 2017).⁴⁸ As 
mentioned, Uzbekistan is the most populous country in CA, and 60 
percent of its 32 million people are under 25 years old (2017 data). 
The population has the highest growth rate in CA, which creates a 
large market for toys and child-related products. In the Soviet era, 
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Uzbekistan hosted one of the region’s largest toy factories. However, 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union and aging technology, the plant 
was unable to meet the needs of the market. The quality of toys im-
ported from other countries, including China, was at the level expect-
ed by consumers, motivating the government to seek a solution. Toy 
imports reached USD 2.1 million in 2016 but fell 29 percent in 2017 
due to increasing local production. As mentioned, 94 percent (USD 
2 million) of the toys imported into Uzbekistan are from China; 
Russia’s share is only 2.1 percent (USD 43,000), with the remain-
ing 0.8 percent (USD 16,000) coming from Lithuania (“Uzbekistan 
and China Will Create” 2017).⁴⁹ The new factory (jointly established 
with Shandong Sanhe Toy) cost an estimated USD 23 million; makes 
700 kinds of plastic, soft, electronic, and mechanical toys and pro-
vides 950 jobs in Tashkent.⁵⁰ 
The majority of these projects attempt to establish production 
and infrastructure-related facilities to enable Uzbekistan to produce 
goods not only for its large (but still limited) internal consumption 
but also, importantly, for export. The toy factory aims to produce 
seven million individual toys annually, of which 80 percent are meant 
for export to other countries of CA, Russia, Afghanistan, and beyond. 
Similar plants are also planned in conjunction with other Chinese 
producers (such as Zhejiang Jiyou) in the Jizzakh free economic area 
(“Zhejiang Jiyou Industrial” 2017).⁵¹ 
Similar protocols for intentions to establish production plants for 
ceramics with Peng Yu Special Ceramics and Zhongguo Jingdezhen 
Porcelain and a porcelain production plant with Ru Hong have been 
signed (“FEZ ‘Angren’” 2017).⁵² Although the documents signed 
with representatives of these companies were protocols of intention 
without firm commitments, in June and July 2017 the representatives 
visited possible sites for plant construction and discussed conditions 
with various ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the 
Foreign Investment Agency, and the State Committee for Competition 
Controls.
Among the agreements signed between the two countries, Sun 
Paper Industry and China National Complete Plant Import and 
Export signed a protocol of intentions with the government to create 
a cluster for the production of high-quality paper in the Angren free 
economic zone (“COMPLANT planiruet organizovat’” 2017).⁵³ 
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Uzbekistan currently does not have such facilities and needs to 
import much of the high-quality paper used in office paperwork and 
for wrapping and shipping the goods produced in various plants (“V 
Uzbekistane budet sozdano” 2017).⁵⁴ Delegations from these compa-
nies visited Uzbekistan in September 2017 to evaluate the needs and 
to coordinate equipment supplies with local counterparts.
In terms of the export of Uzbek-made products, the agreements 
signed during President Mirziyoyev’s May 2017 visit included textile 
exports (USD 300 million) and leather (USD 60 million) and agri-
cultural products (USD 1.6 million) in 2017–18. These contracts are 
in active implementation, and the majority are being implemented. 
Additionally, cotton-processing and textile mills have been planned, 
with Chinese participation, in the Qashqadaryo Region for 2017–19. 
Seven textile mills are under construction in Qashqadaryo, and their 
overall cotton-processing capacity will account for 10 percent of 
the annual cotton output of the Qashqadaryo Region (“Uzbekistan 
President Visits Litai” 2017).⁵⁵ The 
Litai project aims to create 500 
jobs using textile machinery from 
the Saurer Group and to produce 
22,000 tons of high-level cotton 
yarn annually, 80 percent for export 
(ibid.).⁵⁶ Wenzhou Jinsheng Trading 
announced that it will initiate seven 
investment projects in the Jizzakh 
economic zone, investing USD 40 million in reprocessing local re-
sources and producing leather goods and metal products, one-third 
of which are to be exported out of Uzbekistan (“Kitaj pomozhet re-
alizovat” 2017).⁵⁷
Korea’s Inroads into Uzbekistan
As mentioned in the previous section, to better understand its es-
sence, the Uzbek-Korean cooperation roadmap can be conceptually 
divided into several consistent parts. First, the roadmap includes 
several framework agreements between governments and plans for 
the co-financing of projects. In particular, the Korean government ex-
tended the grant (USD 500 million through the Export-Import Bank 
Wenzhou Jinsheng Trading 
announced that it will 
invest USD 40 million in the 
Jizzakh economic zone
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of Korea (Korea Eximbank) to finance the projects that are agreed 
upon in consultations between the two governments. Similarly, both 
governments agreed to provide financing to the projects, which are 
to be jointly selected with the participation of experts from both gov-
ernments (with a budget of USD 2 billion for 2018–20). 
Figure 14. Agreements Included in Korea-Uzbek Roadmaps on 
Finance-Related Plans
Financing
Eksimbank of Korea (USD 150 million). Loan for financing of financing of vari-
ous projects
 «GST Korea» (USD 20 million). Loan for leasing of specialized machinery 
of «Hyundai Heavy Industries»
«Road International Co. Ltd» 
(USD 10 million).
«KCP» (USD 10 million). Loan for leasing of cement-
making machinery
«KwangShin» (USD 10 million). Loan for leasing of gas fueling station
Eksimbank of Korea (USD 65 million). Credit line for financing of projects
Eksimbank of Korea (USD 30 million). Additional loan agreement 
Second, the roadmap aims to provide nonfinancial assistance and 
support to Uzbekistan. In particular, both governments developed 
a coordinated set of actions and roadmaps for assisting Uzbekistan 
in joining the World Trade Organization. These measures include 
provisions of consultation and Korean expertise in preparing for 
Uzbekistan’s entry into the WTO. Such entry benefits not only 
Uzbekistan but, importantly, also assists Korean entry into the Uzbek 
market, making such assistance to Uzbekistan an important objective 
for Korean expansion into Uzbekistan. In addition to such inter-
governmental framework agreements, a few agreements on expertise 
exchange were signed by various ministries and state agencies. In 
particular, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Economy and Korea’s Ministry 
of Strategy and Finance signed a memorandum on the exchange of 
know-how regarding the evaluation and selection of goals for devel-
opment (“Korea and Uzbekistan Agree” 2018).⁵⁸
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Figure 15. Nontrade Support and Assistance Agreements between 
Korea and Uzbekistan 
Visits
1 Organization of the visit by the President of Korea Moon in 2018
2 Preparing a visit of PM in 2018
3 Preparing a visit by FM in early 2018 and holding round of negotiations 
between MOFAs
4 Participation in 11th Forum of Republic of Korea-Central Asia in 2018
Inter-parliament exchange
5 Preparing a visit of the Speaker of the Legislative Chamber of Parliament of 
Uzbekistan to Korea
6 Intensification of activities of parliamentarian “groups of friendship” and ties
7 Setting up the meeting of Vice PM in Uzbekistan
Business forums
8 Uzbek Korean Intergovernmental committee for economic (trade-econom-
ic) cooperation in Uzb.
9 Holding regular business forums under the auspices of PMs 
10 Creation of working group on the Most preferable trade partner status in 
Uzb-Korean trade
11 Creation of chapter to support Korean businesses under the auspices of Uzb. 
Chamber of Commerce
12 Increase of annual trade volume to 3 billion USD in the nearest years (ura-
nium, metals, agricultural products, construction materials, chemical and 
oil products
13 Implementation of 24 export contracts for USD 231 million
14 Improvements in the functioning of Navoi logistics center
15 Setting up a long-term cooperation between quarantine services
16 Establishing representative office of Agency on foreign labor migration of 
Uzbekistan in Kwanju
In cultural fields
17 Opening a Korean culture house in Tashkent
18 Creating a Museum of Korean Diaspora in Uzbekistan
19 Renaming one of the central streets in Tashkent after city of Seoul 
20 Establishing a recreational park named after city of Seoul
21 Hiring a specialist from the city mayor’s office of Seoul as a consultant for 
mayor of Tashkent
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In educational fields
22 Organization of long-term cooperation with «Myongji Hospital».
23 Creating of clinics of Chong in Tashkent.
24 Setting up cooperation between Min. of Healthcare and Gachon University 
Gil Medical Center
25 Organization of visits of medical doctors from Chonnam University and 
holding master classes
26 Appointing the general director of Chonnam University into honorary Ex-
ecutive Adviser of Ministry of Healthcare of Uzbekistan  
27 Training of healthcare specialists in the clinics of Korea
28 Visits by members of Association of Prominent Medical Specialists of Korea 
with master classes
29 Organization of charity medical events for children with born defects 
and disabilities
30 Discussions opening up a Korean University branch on urbanization, archi-
tecture and city design
31 Organization of joint experimental smart kindergartens with the fund 
«AI COREA»
32 Seminars on pre-school education with faculty of Sangmyong, Chonnam, 
Chung and Korea Univ.
33 Implementation of agreement on transfer of from «Booyoung» company of 
2000 electrical pianos for educational institutions of Uzbekistan (Korean 
side delivers the pianos to the nearest sea port from where the Uzbek side 
provides transportation costs to Uzbekistan).
A similar memorandum was signed by both countries’ ministries 
of justice. In terms of some tangible knowledge transfer for use by 
entrepreneurs, Uzbekistan’s government reached an agreement with 
relevant actors, such as the Korea Trade Network (KTNET), on as-
sistance in the development and introduction of a national electronic 
trade platform using the Korean experience. In line with this agree-
ment, experts from KTNET will assist the Uzbek government in pre-
paring the platform for internet-based trade, and, once the proposal 
is agreed upon by the Uzbek government, the request for funding will 
be submitted to one of the Korean financial institutions.⁵⁹
Third, such a trade platform for Uzbekistan needs to be prepared 
because Uzbek agricultural and industrial producers are often cut off 
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from domestic and international consumers due to logistical problems 
related to connecting demand and supply. In many instances, produc-
ers have to rely on personal connections and “word of a mouth” in find-
ing their trading partners. Cooperation with Korea aims to alleviate 
this problem by connecting Uzbek and Korean producers and consum-
ers in direct contractual relations across various areas such as energy, 
agriculture, and urban construction, as indicated in the tables below. 
Figure 16. Number of Cooperation Documents in Various Areas 
between Uzbekistan and Korea
Figure 17. Uzbek-Korean Trade and Investment Related 
Agreements (USD billion) 
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As can also be seen in the figures below, the contracts include 
clearly defined products and amounts to be invested in these areas by 
Korean and Uzbek counterparts. The roadmap also details the com-
panies’ names, their expected investment amounts, and the expected 
outcome of such cooperation. While not all of these materialize, they 
represent a very concrete and focused approach to the facilitation of 
interaction between the private enterprises. 
Figure 18. Uzbek-Korean Agreements in Energy, Oil, and Chemistry
Energy, Oil and Chemistry field – 15 documents 
(USD 4.2 billion)
1 Consortium of «POSCO Daewoo» 
and «Hyundai Engineering and Con-
struction» – (USD 1.8 billion)
3 projects: Construction of Heat 
Electric Stations (Navoi, Tahiatash 
and modernization of Bukhara, Sa-
markand and Jizzakh HES
2  Sprott Korea Corp. (USD 1 billion). Construction of Solar Energy Sta-
tions (1000 Mvt) (2018–2019)
3 «Samsung Engineering» 
(USD 106 million)
Modernization of Fergana 
Azot factory
4 «SK Engineering and Construction» 
(USD 250 million).
Processing of garbage
5 «GS Engineering & Construction» 
(USD 200 million).
Processing of 250 thousand tons of 
methanol into gasoline using MTG
6 «POSCO Daewoo» 
(USD 127,5 million).
Production of solar panel modules
7 «Seoul Electronics & Telecom Co.ltd» 
(USD 50 million).
Production of energy efficient lamps
8 «Kiturami» (USD 50 million) Production of heating grids
9 «KNOC» (USD 24.5 million). Search drilling on Dekhkanabad and 
Tashkurgan sites
10 «Winhousing» (USD 4.2 million). Production of wall paper on Fergha-
na Azot plant
11 «Jeil Architecture» (USD 1 million). Production of floor heating equipment 
12 «Daesung Celyic Enersys» 
(USD 1 million).
Production of heating grids
13  «Capital Industrial Development Co. 
Ltd.» (USD 10 million).
Production of motor oil
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Energy, Oil and Chemistry field – 15 documents 
(USD 4.2 billion)
14 «NK Group» (USD 2 million). JV for maintenance of stationary 
and mobile Natural Gas  
Compressor Stations.
Figure 19. Uzbek-Korean Agreements and Contracts in the Fields 
of Building and Construction, Machinery Production, Chemistry, 
and Agriculture
Building and construction
15 «Hyundai Engineering» 
(USD 1 million).
Processing of natural gas, value-add-
ed production
16 «POSCO Daewoo» (USD 1.4 billion). «High Tech City» construction 
in Tashkent
17 «G&W Co Ltd.» (USD 280 million). «Tashkent city» business center con-
struction
18 «Leaders Country Club Co., Ltd.» 
(USD 70 million).
Golf field and housing construction 
in Tashkent 
19 «Keumdo Group Co. Ltd» 
(USD 8 million).
Housing construction
20 «Jeil Construction» (USD 6 million). Construction of eco-village in the 
Tashkent region
21 «GEO 2 Co., Ltd.» (USD 3 million). Creation of digital city inventory of 
buildings in Tashkent
22 «Triniti International Inc.» 
(USD 2.7 million).
 «Tashkent Lakeside Golf Club» 
construction
23 «Khil Pyung Co. Ltd» 
(USD 7 million).
Housing construction in Sergeli dis-
trict of Tashkent
24 Evergreen Holdings» 
(USD 300 million).
Cement production plant 
25 «SY Panel Co. Ltd.» (USD 50 million). Production of construction panels 
26 «IL KWANG E&C», «HCND» 
(USD 50 million).
Housing construction
27 «Hyundai Department Store Group» 
(USD 20 million).
Construction of logistics center for 
construction machinery 
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28 «erae cs limited» (USD 20 million). Production of painting materials
29 «Evergreen Holdings» 
(USD 10 million).
Processing of mineral stones 
30 «OJOO Tech» (USD 4 million). Production of  
Medium-density fibreboard 
31 «Nurichem Co. Ltd.» 
(USD 2 million).
Production of construction 
hermetic materials 
Machinery production
32 «Evergreen Motors» 
(USD 200 million).
Production of «Hyundai» machinery
33 JV with «Everdigm» (USD 3 million). Production of specialized machinery 
«Everdigm»
34 «GM Korea» (USD 143.8 million). Production of new line of the car 
(Tracker) 
35 «GM Korea» (USD 25 million). Production of new type of engine 
(1.8 l.c) 
36 «GM Korea» (USD 15 million). Production of modernized version 
of Cobalt
37 «Dong Kwang Group» 
(USD 3 million).
Production of motorcycles 
and tricycles 
38 «Erae» (USD 1.7 million). Production of ventilation and heat-
ing systems for automobiles
39 «GW International» 
(USD 1.1 million).
Production of plasmatic parts 
of automobiles
40 «Youngone Corp» (USD 25 million). Production of sewing machines in 
Tashkent and Samarkand
41 «DAEWON CO.» (USD 10 million). Production of textiles for 
school uniforms
42 «Samwon Ind. Co., Ltd.» 
(USD 2.5 million).
Production of textile paints
43 «Textile Technologies Group» 
(2 stage) (USD 1.8 million).
Production of textile paints 
Chemistry
44 «Erae» (USD 20 million). Production of medical components
45 «Dalim Biotech» (USD 5 million). Production of antidiabetic medicines
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46 «Yuhan» (USD 3 million). Production of medical components
47 «Shindong Resources» 
(USD 10 million).
Industrial gold production
48 «Shindong Resources» 
(USD 3 million).
Industrial wolfram production
49 «Hanjin D&B Equipment» 
(USD 3 million).
Production of drilling equipment
Agriculture
50 «Erae» (USD 60 million). Construction of logistics center for 
agricultural products
51 «Erae» (USD 60 million). Production of indoor 
agricultural production
52 «Human & Idea Co. Ltd.» 
(USD 20 million).
Poultry facilities construction
53 «CIELIE Co.» (USD 12 million). Processing of agricultural products
54 «SEJIN G&E» (USD 50 million). Waste utilization and management
55  «LG CNS» (USD 25 million). Public Transportation Management 
(TOPIS)
56 «Hwachon Plant—Gemco» (USD 
30 million).
Production of jewelry
57  «AVID» (USD 5 million). Production of jewelry
Figure 20. Uzbek-Korean Export Contracts on Particular Products
Contract for delivery of uranium for USD 72 million
Contract for delivery of cotton textile for USD 12 million
Contract for delivery of beans for USD 1 million
Contract for delivery of 2000 ton of medium for USD 13 million
Contract for delivery of 1000 ton of agricultural products for USD 3 million
Framework agreement for delivery for 3000 ton of medium for USD 19.5 million
Contract for delivery of cherry for USD 2 million
Contract for delivery of 2000 ton of beans for USD 1.6 million
Contract for delivery of 600 ton of   pomegranate for USD 600,000
Contract for delivery of beans and cherry for USD 10 million
Uzbekengilsanoat  - 12 contracts for USD 94.3 million
Contracts (5) for delivery of cherry for and textile for USD 2.45 million
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Contracts (3) for delivery of cotton textile for USD 61.4 million
Contracts for delivery of textile products for USD 15.4 million
Contract for textile products for USD 14.8 thousand
Contract for delivery of silk нитей for the USD 400,000
Agreement for joint sells of textile products for USD 30 million
Contract for delivery of leather for USD 2 million 
Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Employment and Labor Resources of 
Uzbekistan and Ministry of Personnel Management have concluded 
a memorandum on cooperation in labor resource management ad-
dressing the matter of abundant labor resources (the number of 
unemployed people seeking employment in Korea or elsewhere that 
exceeds needs domestically) in Uzbekistan. In particular, this memo-
randum is expected to provide some management of the uncontrolled 
labor migration from Uzbekistan to Korea. While Korea displays 
openness in accepting such laborers, the Korean side is concerned 
about illegally employed laborers frequently overstaying their legal 
permits. Connected to such memorandums is the range of agree-
ments within the cooperation roadmap that aim for the opening of 
educational and vocational training institutions in Uzbekistan by 
Korean universities and institutions. These are agreements on opening 
a branch of Pohan Polytechnic University (agreement with POSCO 
Daewoo) and a branch of Ajou University with a medical clinic; an 
agreement between the Ministry of Healthcare of Uzbekistan and the 
Medical Leaders Corporation of Korea; a “roadmap” signed by the 
Korean Institute of Rare Metals (KIRAM) on cooperation in scien-
tific, technical, and innovation activities with the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade of Uzbekistan and on training and exchange of expertise with 
the Almalyk Mountain Metallurgical Plant (“Uzbekistan and South 
Korea Sign Documents” 2017);⁶⁰ and agreements on cooperation 
in training personnel for geological works with Chonnam National 
University and on the creation of a joint institute with the Korean 
Research Institute of Chemical Technology (KRICT) (“Uzbekistan 
and KRICT” 2017).⁶¹
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Japanese Roadmaps into Uzbekistan
Certain features stand out in reading through the roadmap of eco-
nomic cooperation between Japan and Uzbekistan. The first feature 
is the importance of government-to-government cooperation in 
relations between the two countries. To some extent, this feature 
again confirms the importance of the style of governance and in-
ternational cooperation in the CA region, especially in Uzbekistan. 
Although styles of governance differ between Japan and Uzbekistan, 
governments remain important in paving the way for international 
cooperation and defining the degree of success of international en-
gagement for Uzbekistan. With regard to the hesitance displayed by 
the Japanese corporate community, the Japanese government and 
its assistance schemes stand out as the most important factor of the 
Japanese foreign policy engagement in CA and Uzbekistan. In this 
sense, Japan has historically been active and has provided significant 
amounts of ODA assistance, which was crucial for Uzbekistan’s eco-
nomic survival, especially in the early years of its independence (the 
early 1990s). This pattern of Japanese engagement, using ODA as 
the main tool for its influence in this region, is also reflected in the 
latest roadmaps between Japan and Uzbekistan. In contrast to the 
Chinese and Korean roadmaps, which include a significant number 
of projects featuring private companies and enterprises, the Japanese 
roadmap of cooperation with Uzbekistan contains mostly projects 
and initiatives in which the Japanese government plays the most im-
portant role. Structurally, these roadmaps can be divided into two 
main parts. The first part consists of the roadmaps of cooperation 
aiming to facilitate smooth interaction between both countries’ gov-
ernments and governmental agencies, as is demonstrated in Figure 21.
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Figure 21. Uzbek-Japanese Roadmaps of  
Intergovernmental Interaction
No. Planned 
Interaction
Main 
actors
Essence
Political Field
1 Facilitation of the first visit 
of President Mirziyoyev 
to Japan.
MOFA, 
MEECAT
Invitation received from 
FM Kishida during 6th 
Central Asia Plus 
Japan Dialogue forum 
in Turkmenistan
2 Implementation of the 
strategic partnership between 
Uzbekistan and Japan con-
cluded during the visit of PM 
Abe to Uzbekistan, October 
24–26, 2015.
MOFA, 
MEECAT
Bilateral negotiations at 
the level of embassies, 
MOFA, etc. Few tangible 
outcomes though.
3 Facilitation of cooperation 
between MOFA of Uzbeki-
stan and Japan 2015–2017.
MOFA, 
MEECAT
16th and 17th round of 
political consultations in 
Tokyo and Tashkent.
4 Inter-parliamentary interac-
tions and facilitation of the 
2nd inter-parliamentary 
cooperation meeting.
MOFA, 
Oliy Majlis, 
Diet
Deliberations with Japa-
nese Parliamentary 
League of Friendship 
with Uzbekistan about 
holding the forum in 
Tashkent
5 Facilitation of inter-MOFA 
political consultations.
MOFA November 2017, Tash-
kent (planned)
6 Participation of delegation 
of Uzbekistan in the 6th 
Central Asia Plus Japan 
Dialogue forum in Turk-
menistan.
MOFA, 
MEECAT,
Ministry 
of Water 
Management
May 1, 2017
7 Review of legal documents 
related to the cooperation 
between Uzbekistan 
and Japan.
MOFA, 
related 
agencies
Review is planned for the 
second half of 2017
48 Timur Dadabaev
Intergovernmental cooperation has historically been the strong 
area in relations between the two countries. Japan is a country that 
has historically been welcomed to the CA region. Its colonial and im-
perial history in the East Asian context is not well known or relevant 
to the CA context. Thus, CA, and Uzbekistan, in particular, remains 
one of the most Japan-friendly regions and countries in the world 
judging from a number of public polls conducted from the mid-
2000s to 2015. The relative distance of Japan from the CA region, 
its ODA assistance, and the egalitarian way its companies treat the 
local workforce (especially when compared to the Chinese corpora-
tions, which tend to bring a Chinese labor force and discriminate 
against local workers) create a significant expectation from the local 
business community and population for Japan’s wider involvement in 
this region. However, as featured in the first part of the roadmaps and 
displayed in the activities envisaged in Figure 21, intergovernmental 
contacts (as opposed to private enterprises) remain the largest driver 
of cooperation between the two countries. Accordingly, these activi-
ties focus on facilitating the visit to Tokyo of Mirziyoyev, the newly 
elected president of Uzbekistan, meetings of foreign ministers, par-
ticipation within multilateral forums such as Central Asia plus Japan 
and reconfirming the framework agreements and other legal docu-
ments stipulating relations between the two countries. These types of 
activities are conducted between Uzbekistan and most of its foreign 
partners. However, they also demonstrate that, although Japan has 
been very active in the field of Official Development Assistance and 
has provided much-needed and appreciated educational grants, much 
room remains for the expansion of political activities into the field of 
economic interactions. 
As seen in Figure 22, many attempts have been made to revitalize 
economic cooperation between the two countries, which currently 
lags far behind the Japanese advances in the fields of political dia-
logue and humanitarian assistance. Regular meetings within the joint 
economic cooperation committee and attempts to initiate various 
business forums (cotton, textile, and agricultural fairs) and to attract 
the Japanese corporate community into more active participation in 
the Uzbek economy have not yet yielded tangible outcomes. There are 
several reasons for such passive Japanese participation in Uzbekistan’s 
economy when compared to Chinese and Korean participation. The 
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first relates to the logistics of establishing and facilitating such cooper-
ation. As mentioned in the section on the structure and implementa-
tion of roadmaps, Japanese interactions are coordinated by ROTOBO, 
which by its nature is not an organization with an executive branch. 
Thus, it has very limited capacity to perform any functions that can 
enforce decisions made within the intergovernmental economic co-
operation committee. While ROTOBO’s members regularly visit CA 
and organize various events, these only imitate productive activity 
without leading to any tangible outcomes. The reason ROTOBO is 
charged with the important mission of facilitating economic activity 
is related to the structure of the liberal market economy in Japan, 
where private interests are rarely connected to public institutions. 
Thus, ROTOBO considers its role to involve only facilitating interac-
tion and not identifying or suggesting appropriate behaviors for the 
business community. While ROTOBO’s approach is reasonable for 
Japan’s conditions, such a structure for economic cooperation leaves 
CA countries, in particular, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, dissatisfied 
with their governmental institutions and ministries partnering with 
a nongovernmental organization such as ROTOBO. Many CA gov-
ernments suggest that to revitalize relations in the practical realm, 
they must challenge ROTOBO’s status and possibly replace it with a 
governmental institution capable of delivering tangible outcomes, as 
opposed to merely organizing forums and meetings.⁶² 
The second issue has to do with the behavioral pattern of the 
Japanese corporate community, which feels satiated with sufficient 
contracts and business opportunities generated in East Asia and else-
where. For them, there is little incentive to penetrate CA markets, in-
cluding Uzbekistan. Therefore, while Chinese businesses, which have 
governmental guarantees and support, find motivations to penetrate 
the geographically close CA states, Japanese companies do not yet see 
the added value in being offered an entrance to this region. To a large 
extent, the problems related to legal infrastructure and the perceived 
risks of this market significantly influence such decisions.
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Figure 22. Japanese-Uzbek Cooperation in Economic Areas
No. Planned 
Interaction
Aim Essence
In trade and economic field
1 Holding of the14th 
round of Joint Uzbek-
Japan and Japan-
Uzbek Economic 
Cooperation 
Committee sessions 
in Tokyo.
Deepening of 
economic cooperation 
and monitoring of 
current situation
14th round of Joint 
Uzbek-Japan and 
Japan-Uzbek Eco-
nomic Cooperation 
Committee sessions in 
Tokyo planned for 
October 4, 2017
4 Facilitation of the 
participation of the 
Japanese companies in 
the Cotton Fair and 
the Agricultural Fair 
in Tashkent.
Concluding contracts 
for exports of cotton, 
textile and agricultural 
products to Japan
Facilitation of the 
participation of the 
Japanese companies 
in the Cotton Fair in 
Tashkent as well as the 
Agricultural Fair in 
Tashkent
11 Facilitation of mu-
tual visits of corporate 
community of the two 
countries with presen-
tations for cooperation 
potential.
Expansion of 
cooperation
- ROTOBO, May 
25–26, 2017
- Hokkaido Intellect 
Tank, March–April, 
2017 for preparing the 
concept of “Strength-
ening the potential of 
the agricultural sector 
of Uzbekistan”
- Torishima com-
pany, M. Nishimura, 
rehabilitation of pump 
stations in 
Tashkent region
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No. Planned 
Interaction
Aim Essence
12 Facilitation of 
participation of 
Japanese companies 
in privatization of 
property in Uzbekistan 
and introduction of 
Japanese technological 
innovations.
Sales of shares and 
properties
Offering participation 
in privatization (data-
base of 150 companies 
has been formed and 
information on the 
possible objects of 
privatization has been 
channeled with the 
passports of the priva-
tized buildings; work 
through the embassy 
on spreading the word 
on these properties 
continues)
13 Expanding coopera-
tion in providing edu-
cation to specialists in 
the fields of economy 
(grants for MA pro-
grams through the 
channel of technical 
cooperation); prepara-
tion of Global Public 
Leadership Program 
for public servants 
through JICA.
Education and training 15 scholarships for MA 
studies in 2017–2018; 
preparation of Global 
Public Leadership 
Program for public 
servants through JICA 
14 Jupiter 2 Implementation of 
Jupiter 2 actions for 
2017–2020.
Uzbekenergo and JICA
As a result, as indicated below, Japanese humanitarian assistance, 
government-provided educational grants and loans, and JICA-led as-
sistance projects dominate the agenda for cooperation, thus attribut-
ing to Japan the role of one of the largest assistance providers but not 
of an economic partner.
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Figure 23. JICA Disbursements to CA and the Caucasus
Total Value of JICA 
programs (in mil-
lions of YEN)
Composition ratio 
%
Uzbekistan 38,898 73.8
Azerbaijan 5,055 9.6
Tajikistan 3,349 6.4
Kirgiz Republic 2,948 5.6
Georgia 1,803 3.4
Armenia 466 0.9
Kazakhstan 155 0.3
Turkmenistan 22 0
Source: JICA Activity Report, 2016, “East Asia and Central Asia: Toward Sustained 
Economic Development through Strengthening Regional Connectivity and 
Diversifying Industries,” https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/an-
nual/2017/c8h0vm0000bws721-att/2017_06.pdf.
Conclusion
A few conclusions can be drawn from the outline of the economic 
cooperation roadmaps of China, Korea, and Japan. The first conclu-
sion is that economic cooperation roadmaps merely represent the 
intentions of the governments and other nongovernmental organiza-
tions to pursue certain goals and objectives. In this sense, this paper 
treats these roadmaps as a type of political narrative. Thus, the mere 
fact that these roadmaps have been agreed upon does not necessarily 
imply that they will be implemented. 
However, they still represent very 
clearly formulated documents with 
actors, budgets, and time-frame defi-
nitions that can be treated as generat-
ing certain political messages. 
Second, economic cooperation 
roadmaps are indicative of the ap-
proaches and goals of China, Japan, 
Economic cooperation 
roadmaps are indicative of 
the ap proaches and goals of 
China, Japan, and Korea in 
Central Asia
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and Korea in this part of the world. They indicate the expectations of 
cooperating with CA states, exemplified by the case of Uzbekistan. In 
particular, the Chinese approach indicated in the roadmap’s agenda is 
to exploit China’s competitive advantage of close geographical prox-
imity to this energy-resource-endowed region. In addition, China 
aims to exploit its advantage in technological advances by exporting 
its machinery to Uzbekistan’s for the country’s further industrializa-
tion. In addition, China aims to use its abundant financial resources 
to fund certain projects that primarily benefit Chinese corporate 
interests while also having a certain positive impact on the Uzbek 
economy. Yet China emphasizes that its initiatives are to support 
Uzbekistan’s developmental strategy for 2017–20; thus, for China, 
the Uzbek government’s task is to ensure that the strategy’s aims and 
goals are properly formulated to securely defend Uzbek interests. In 
this sense, it would be unrealistic to expect that China is in Uzbekistan 
to ensure that Uzbekistan benefits. In contrast, China aims to secure 
its own economic interests while leaving it to the Uzbek govern-
ment to ensure that cooperation with China will benefit the Uzbek 
economy. In this sense, China-Uzbekistan cooperation is a pragmatic 
cooperation aimed to achieve each government’s clearly defined goals. 
Very little emotional attachment is displayed by either government in 
pursuing these roadmaps. 
Japanese roadmaps, on the contrary, lack the pragmatic goals 
and aims that clearly benefit the Japanese corporate community or 
the Japanese government. In contrast with the Chinese approach, 
Japanese roadmaps emphasize the Japanese commitment to develop-
ing Uzbekistan and strengthening its human capital development and 
capacity to deal with local economic problems. However, the largest 
problem in Japanese roadmaps is that they do not clearly demon-
strate how the Japanese corporate community and taxpayers benefit 
from its engagement through their implementation. 
Korean roadmaps represent the mode of engagement that com-
bines the pragmatism seen in the Chinese roadmaps and the emotional 
attachment to developing Uzbekistan seen in the Japanese roadmaps. 
On the one hand, Korean roadmaps clearly aim to benefit the Korean 
business community, demonstrated by the number of projects and 
the spectrum of areas covered by those roadmaps. On the other 
hand, Korean roadmaps also include a huge cluster of human capital 
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development, such as establishing a great number of educational 
institutions, supporting human resource development programs for 
Uzbek bureaucracy, supporting the increase of Uzbek nationals in 
the international organizations, providing know-how for establishing 
digital trade platforms, and providing know-how for entry into the 
World Trade Organization. These components of Korean roadmaps 
demonstrate Korea’s message to Uzbekistan: it is interested in benefit-
ing from the opportunities in the Uzbek economy, but it also aims 
to contribute to certain areas in which it has significant experience. 
Third, these roadmaps are both a result and a consequence of the 
pattern of interactions between these states. While the frequency of 
interactions between the governments does not necessarily relate to 
the quality of those interactions, the cases of China, Korea, and Japan 
demonstrate that a certain relationship between the frequency and 
outcomes of the visits of heads of state and governments. As men-
tioned in the first section of this paper, the Chinese heads of state and 
governments are frequent visitors to Uzbekistan, sometimes visiting 
several times per year. In addition, leaders of the two countries meet 
at various events related to the SCO and BRI in China and elsewhere. 
Such frequency leads to denser discussions on various issues, thereby 
contributing to the increasing number of projects in economic co-
operation roadmaps. This relationship has led to the inclusion of 
the largest number of projects in the roadmap of cooperation be-
tween China and Uzbekistan. Leaders of Korea and Uzbekistan do 
not meet as frequently as the leaders of China and Uzbekistan; they 
have met almost annually (in 1992, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2005, 2006, 
and twice in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2017), 
and their meetings happen annually or biannually depending on the 
agenda. Such frequency allows for constructive cooperation across 
various fields, resulting in less ambitious but still significant agen-
das for cooperation. While the total volume of contracts, in terms 
of amount, is not as high as those between China and Uzbekistan, 
the project spectrum exceeds that between China and Uzbekistan. 
At the same time, the leaders of Japan and Uzbekistan meet only 
occasionally, but once every several years. The leaders of Japan have 
visited CA and Uzbekistan only twice, and Uzbek leaders have visited 
Japan three times over the period of independence. While the level of 
high-official meetings is considerably high at the level of the Central 
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Asia plus Japan initiative, the process of preparing economic coopera-
tion roadmaps intensifies before and at the time of visits of heads of 
state. The agendas of the economic cooperation plans demonstrate 
that the spectrum of the areas is rather limited and primarily focuses 
on the interaction between the governments, leaving much potential 
for further development. 
The fourth observation relates to the areas covered by the eco-
nomic cooperation roadmaps of the three states covered in this paper. 
The Chinese economic cooperation roadmaps demonstrate the high-
est volume in terms of amounts of contracts and agreements. In terms 
of areas of cooperation, they relate mainly to three areas: energy, 
infrastructure development, and manufacturing. Korean roadmaps 
do not match Chinese ones in terms of amounts; the spectrum of 
projects and areas of cooperation exceed the Chinese-Uzbek econom-
ic cooperation roadmaps. Interestingly, the main actors within the 
Korean-Uzbek economic cooperation maps consist of a large number 
of smaller enterprises, while the 
Chinese roadmaps are dominated 
by larger enterprises working in 
the fields of energy and infrastruc-
ture development. The share of 
smaller enterprises in the Chinese-
Uzbek roadmaps is smaller when 
compared to the Korean-Uzbek 
roadmaps. This finding can be 
explained by the difference in the 
economic structures of China and 
Korea as described in the section 
of this paper dealing with the 
issues of governance and economic cooperation. The Japanese-Uzbek 
roadmaps are primarily dominated by the cooperation between the 
governments and by framework agreements. 
The fifth observation relates to the comparison of Chinese, Korean, 
and Japanese roadmaps in the humanitarian field. While Chinese-
Uzbek economic cooperation roadmaps are focused on promotion 
of economic cooperation, the share in the humanitarian field is very 
limited. In contrast, Korean and the Japanese cooperation road-
maps include a large number of projects and initiatives related to 
While Chinese-Uzbek economic 
cooperation roadmaps focus on 
economic cooperation, while 
Korean and the Japanese 
cooperation road maps focus on 
humanitarian cooperation
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humanitarian cooperation. A significant number of projects initiated 
by Korea relate to the establishment of universities, research institu-
tions, and research facilities. Similarly, the Japanese roadmaps relate 
to grants for educational activities and education-related projects of 
JICA. They might not necessarily relate to immediate income gen-
eration, but they contribute importantly to human capacity devel-
opment in Uzbekistan, which advertently relates to the increase in 
economic potential.
The final observation relates to the spectrum of actors involved 
in the cooperation between the countries. In the Chinese case, the 
government plays the roles of both facilitator and executor of many 
agreements. In the Korean case, private corporate enterprises lead the 
way in fostering cooperation. Additionally, increased intensification 
of private economic activity in the country encourages the govern-
ment to intensify its involvement. Japanese involvement demon-
strates a different pattern in which public institutions of government 
and developmental assistance agencies lead the way in establishing 
cooperation. However, at this stage, such governmental activity does 
not necessarily translate into private enterprise involvement. This 
issue is somewhat improved in the 2018 economic roadmaps of 
Japan-Uzbek cooperation, which are not covered in this paper. 
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